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Abstract
Can we appreciate in a serious and deep way the aesthetic
qualities of wild species in exemplars held captive for exhibition
in the artificial installations of a zoo? To answer this question I
invoke theories concerning the aesthetic appreciation of nature
propounded by Yuriko Saito and Allen Carlson. I then argue
that zoos impose their story on animals, thereby preventing us
from appreciating the animals on their own terms. I claim that
captivity and its effects on the health, behavior, and
appearance of animals make serious and deep appreciation of
the aesthetic qualities of wild species impossible.
Key Words
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1. Introduction
According to the IUCN, over 23,000 animal and plant species
are at risk of extinction because of human activity. In such a
drastic situation, zoological parks have come to defend a
supposed role they play in animal conservation. They affirm
that exemplars kept in captivity act as ambassadors for wild
populations, as a visit to the zoo raises awareness of the need
to protect wildlife in their natural habitat. Zoos claim that the
aesthetic appeal of animals, alongside moral and scientific
reasons, will inspire people to protect threatened species.
The hope that aesthetic appreciation of nature will lead to an
ethical commitment is shared by many, from philosophers to
environmentalists. What is specific to zoos, however, is that
they aim to show the aesthetic qualities of animals through the
menageries they hold captive. Several philosophers and
experts on wildlife have criticized the holding of animals
captive in zoos on moral and scientific grounds.[1] I completely
agree with those criticisms but here I want to explore a
question that belongs to the field of aesthetics: Can captive
exemplars in the artificial installations of a zoo reveal to us the
beauty, ferocity, elegance, grace and monstrosity of their
species in a serious and deep way?
In searching for an answer to this question, I have come across
a range of ideas. In his book, The Aesthetic Appreciation of
Nature, Malcolm Budd answers the question in the affirmative:
At a zoo you cannot appreciate an animal in its
natural environment. But it does not follow that
your appreciation must be of a caged animal – an
animal as caged. Rather, you can ignore its
surroundings and appreciate the animal itself
(within the severe limits imposed by its captive
state).[2]
An opposing answer comes from Holmes Rolston III, who
compares the experience of seeing wild animals in their natural
habitat to exemplars in a zoo:
[T]he wildlife encounters are entirely off the map.
One needs proper habitat, of course, but habitat
is necessary not sufficient for encounter. You
have hoped for six days of the Yellowstone trip to
see a bear, and on the last day, there one is, only
a cub, but a bear nevertheless, feeding in the
Shepherdia bushes.
You never expected the coyote, and he walked by
the car, six feet away, taking you by such surprise
that you couldn’t get the camera from the back
seat. … This explains why zoos do little to
preserve wildlife aesthetically. … a caged bobcat
is aesthetically a bobcat no more.[3]
Although I have found some answers to the question that
concerns me here, unfortunately I have not found any
systematic analysis or, even less, a discussion among several
authors. This absence of debate is symptomatic of the fact that
the aesthetic appreciation of animals receives little attention.
Indeed, there are not enough publications on the topic for us to
be properly justified in talking of a specific research field with
its own tradition, a canon of fundamental papers and books, its
own discussions, and everything else that constitutes a specific
field of research in philosophy.
Because there is not yet a proper field of animal aesthetics, in
order to articulate an answer to my question, I take the
theoretical framework for it from environmental aesthetics.
First, I consider Yuriko Saito’s idea that to appreciate a natural
object means to appreciate the object as it really is, not as if it
were some other thing. Second, I examine Allen Carlson’s
thesis that in order to aesthetically appreciate a natural
element, we need to have scientific knowledge of it. Although
both Saito and Carlson mostly develop these theories as they
relate to environments and only briefly apply them to animals,
I find them to be a sound foundation on which to build a theory
of animal aesthetics.
In the next section of this paper, I use Saito’s and Carlson’s
views to show why, at first glance, it seems that at a zoo we
can appreciate the aesthetic qualities of wild animals. Then, in
the third section, I continue working with Saito’s and Carlson’s
theories to argue that, in fact, if we explore this question in a
more rigorous and critical manner, we come to realize that at a
zoo we cannot appreciate the aesthetic qualities of animals in a
serious and deep way. In the fourth section, I synthesize and
discuss both sets of arguments. Connecting with that
discussion, in the fifth section, I defend the necessity of
developing a field of research on the aesthetic appreciation of
animals. Finally, I offer some conclusions.
2. Reasons why it seems that we can appreciate the
aesthetic qualities of wild species through exemplars
held captive in zoos
2.1 In her paper, “Appreciating Nature on Its Own Terms,”
Saito affirms that in order to appreciate nature aesthetically in
an appropriate way, we must appreciate nature as it is.[4] If
we project our own stories onto nature, we negate the
possibility of knowing and appreciating the reality of nature. I
find Saito’s idea insightful because we often do instrumentalize
nature as a vehicle to transmit human meaning. When animals,
natural environments, and other natural elements are depicted
in art or publicity, they are usually presented as metaphors for
or symbols of human emotions and ideas, not as what they
themselves actually are. Saito claims that any natural element
has its own biological role to play, its own story, independent
of the symbols we may impose on it. Because of this, in order
to appreciate nature in a deep way, we should listen to
nature’s own story.
I think this should be a fundamental idea in the development of
animal aesthetics. However, I wish to make one small point
explicit. Definitely, seeing a natural element “on its own terms”
is more an ideal to orient us than a goal that we can fully
achieve. Complete objectivity is impossible, as many
philosophers have argued, because we humans always
appreciate nature from our own perspective, that is, from
within our own biological nature, our culture, and our
subjectivity, and we cannot totally free ourselves from that.
Nonetheless, to assume that we should conceive of and
appreciate a natural element on its own terms is the
appropriate attitude because it implies a basic form of respect
and fosters critical reflection on our own appreciation of nature.
The subject has to listen to the object, to its otherness, and
not to subsume it into his or her own desires and fantasies, not
to instrumentalize it as a mere metaphor for his or her own
views, not to reduce it to a mirror for self reflection. For
example, the use of an image of a desert in an advertisement
to sell cars or an image of a hawk to sell perfumes are clear
cases of natural elements not being seen as what they are but
being instrumentalized as symbols of human values.
We can use this idea to answer our question. At first glance, it
seems that modern zoos do present animals as they are, as
ambassadors of their species, and not as fantasies or
metaphors. In this sense, zoos appear to be very different from
other modes of exhibiting live animals, such as the circus,
which I mention in the next subsection, and also from
representations of animals, which I consider below in the third
subsection.
It also seems that modern zoos, such as San Diego Zoo in
California or Bioparc in Valencia, Spain, put considerable
thought into their design. The animals are exhibited in
enclosures that aim to recreate their natural habitats, where
we can observe them from a variety of angles and appreciate
many different aspects of their bodies and behavior. Well-
designed zoos offer visitors viewing conditions that they would
never find in nature, where most animals hide from us, and it
is difficult to get  close and observe them for long periods. In
modern zoos, we can even see what goes on inside some dens.
In her article, Saito also affirms that we should not reduce
nature to its visual appearance. The Western tradition of
picturesque painting and aesthetic formalism reduces natural
elements to their pictorial surface and formal design. In
contrast, Saito strongly defends the idea that we should
appreciate nature with all our senses. If we apply this approach
to our question, we can claim that, in a zoo, people hear the
sounds animals make, smell them, and sometimes even touch
them. Appreciating animals in a zoo is a more bodily,
multisensory, and interactive experience than contemplating
them in photographs or films.
2.2 It seems that at a zoo we can appreciate animals better
than in any other type of exhibition of live animals. At a circus,
in contrast, we find animals dressed up and forced to perform
in unnatural ways to the rhythms of music. In fact, what
makes animal circus shows amazing is precisely that the
animals accomplish feats that they would never spontaneously
perform in nature and that are so astonishing as to seem
unbelievable. To see wild animals interact successfully with
artifacts, like a bear playing a trumpet or a chimp riding a
bicycle; to see animals do dangerous things for no reason, like
lions jumping through a hoop of fire; to see predator and prey
interact in unnatural ways, as in a tiger riding a horse; and,
above all, to see animals perform all these acts because a
person orders them to, is so strange that it only seems
possible in a magical world, and this is the kind of emotion that
the circus tries to provoke in its audience. But the sad reality
behind the magic is that this unnatural behavior is the result of
a long and cruel training that provides us with moral
arguments against this kind of practice.
From an aesthetic point of view, the problem is that circus
animals are not presented as themselves. Although the animals
are physically present at the circus, they are not acting as
ambassadors of their species but representing human fantasies
about our ability to dominate and transfigure nature. At a zoo,
in contrast, although the animals are maintained captive in
enclosures designed by human beings, it seems that they are
more autonomous in their behavior.
2.3 Zoos also seem to offer a good opportunity to understand
animals because they present real animals, whereas society is
full of artistic and decorative representations of them. Although
I think that art has the capacity to recount animals’ own stories
and educate us about them, especially when it is allied with
science, if we look at the history of art, the vast majority of
depictions of animals do not represent them on their own
terms but transfigured into symbols of something else.
Nowadays, we are surrounded by representations of animals in
art, publicity, and artifacts that we encounter in our everyday
life. They are omnipresent as commercial brands, as symbols
of human ideas, as fantasy beings created to entertain children
in cartoons, and as mere ornamental figures, for example, in
jewelry.
It is important to consider whether all these representations of
animals, in which they do not appear on their own terms, could
have the effect of making us forget what real animals are like,
or could lead us to confuse real animals with fantasy beings or
metaphors. The team of artists Transnational Temps, formed
by Fred Adam, Andy Deck, and Verónica Perales, deplore the
fact that we are surrounded by images of animals used as
commercial brands, sometimes representing companies that
knowingly reduce biodiversity. The paradox the artists
denounce is that our world is full of images of fantasy animals,
while at the same time we ignore real animals condemned to
extinction.[5]
In her paper, “Aesthetic Value and Wild Animals,” Emily Brady
makes a point in defense of some uses of animals as symbols:
“Some cases of symbolism based on expressive qualities may
therefore be appropriate and reasonable because they are, in
fact, connected to the character and behavior of such
animals.”[6] Even if we accept Brady’s idea, I find it
problematic that the immense majority of our artistic and
decorative representations of animals do not show them as
they really are but transfigure them into something else,
sometimes bound to the animal’s nature and sometimes wildly
arbitrary.
Also Thomas Leddy, in his article, “Aesthetization, Artification,
and Aquariums,” makes a defense of the metaphorical
appreciation of animals:
But is seeing something in terms of a category to
which it does not belong necessarily a bad thing? 
Although this is assumed to be true by most
scientific cognitivists, the thesis limits creativity. 
When we creatively see something, whether in art
or in science, we see it in terms of a category to
which it does not literally belong.  We can call
such seeing “metaphorical perception.”  To say
“Man is a wolf to man.” is to see man in terms of
a category to which he does not belong. 
Nonetheless, when elaborated, this metaphor
presents a possibly valuable thesis concerning the
nature of man.  Many studies in the philosophy of
science, the philosophy of art, and linguistics
show that metaphorical perception plays an
important role in cognition.  Should we exclude
such perception from appreciation of the natural
environment?[7]
The very example Leddy uses shows the problem of this view.
Leddy uses “wolf” as a metaphor applied to human beings. By
this metaphorical sense of “wolf,” he means an irrational beast
driven by egoism, violence, and cruelty. However, when we
scientifically observe the behavior of wolves, we understand
that they are intelligent and deeply social and emotional
creatures, capable of empathy and compassion, who develop a
fundamental role in the environments they inhabit. The real
nature of wolves does not resemble this metaphorical view of
them as an evil beast. To see wolves as dark monsters can be
creative but to disguise reality with our fantasies can have real
consequences. When people believe that wolves are evil
creatures, they will be less disposed to respect and defend
them. The current hate against wolves, and the fact that they
are massively hunted in many countries, has its roots in this
distorted image of them propagated in our culture that has
nothing to do with their real way of life.
2.4 Let us now consider Carlson’s proposal. In his book,
Aesthetics and the Environment, Carlson, like Saito, defends a
cognitive aesthetics, but the difference is that Carlson has a
more strict conception of knowledge.[8] For Carlson, only
natural science provides the framework we require to be able
to appreciate nature as it really is, just as the history and
philosophy of art provide us with the framework required to
appreciate artworks.
Carlson claims that in the Western tradition, two cultural
factors have prevented us from appreciating nature as it really
is: a) religion, which views nature as embodying spiritual
symbols; and b) pictorial representation and aesthetic
formalism, which reduce nature to images. In contrast, Carlson
defends a secular and scientific foundation for the aesthetic
appreciation of nature. It is also important to highlight the fact
that in his defense of scientific knowledge, Carlson is not
referring to vivisection in a laboratory but is invoking
naturalists who familiarize themselves with environments and
their inhabitants, listening to nature’s own stories. Carlson’s
argument evokes the American tradition of nature writing, as
exemplified by Thoreau, Muir, and Leopold.
Carlson’s idea that only natural science provides us with the
framework necessary to appreciate nature as it is has received
several criticisms. Different authors have claimed that science
is not a sure way to objectivity, and that, in spite of its
quantitative approach and strict methodology, science remains
as cultural in its essence as art is.[9] As an example of the
failure of science to offer an objective view, we should
remember that for centuries scientists defended a mechanical
view of animals and nature.
I do not consider these criticisms as sufficient to refute
Carlson’s theory but they should be taken seriously. I think
that one sound response could be to maintain a critical and
prudent attitude to the particular scientific knowledge we are
using, and not to forget the transient nature of scientific
theories. However, this attitude is already a proper part of
science, as scientific progress consists of continuously
rethinking and correcting previous ideas. Also, I  consider that
defending science as the proper framework from which to
appreciate nature aesthetically should not exclude art. It
excludes certain kinds of art but not all art. I consider that
good artistic representations of nature that are scientifically
informed, that bring together art and science, can help us to
appreciate nature aesthetically.[10] In the same way, I think
that traditional knowledge based on accurate observations of
nature can also help us to get to know and appreciate nature
aesthetically, an idea that I think is similar to the one Yuriko
Saito and Thomas Heyd defend.[11]
If we apply Carlson’s theory to our problem, we find that
modern zoos seem to offer a scientific framework within which
to appreciate animals. The distribution of animals within the
zoo corresponds to a scientific classification, and every
enclosure includes information concerning the name of the
species and some scientific background, as in a natural history
museum. In the particular case of aquariums, Nola
Semczyszyn even claims in her paper, “Public Aquariums and
Marine Aesthetics,” that “Aquarium displays should be
considered scientific representations of marine
environments.”[12]
So, at first glance, it certainly seems that at zoos we can
appreciate the aesthetic qualities of wild species. However, if
we continue to analyze this issue in a more rigorous and critical
manner, we will see that in fact we cannot appreciate the
aesthetic qualities of wild animals in a serious and deep way in
a zoo.
3. Reasons why we cannot appreciate the aesthetic
qualities of wild species in a serious and deep way
through exemplars held captive in zoos
3.1 Displaying animals in zoos entails an object model of
appreciation, which Carlson has denounced as inappropriate,
while defending the natural environmental model:
Natural objects possess what might be called
organic unity with their environments of creation:
such objects are a part of, and have developed
out of, the elements of their environments by
means of the forces at work within those
environments. Thus their environments of
creation are aesthetically relevant to natural
objects.[13]
The aesthetic qualities of animals are relational. It is necessary
to perceive the animal in her natural environment in order to
comprehend her. The external appearance of an animal, her
form, color, and kind of fur or feathers she has, the sounds she
produces, and how she moves, all evolved over thousands of
years in particular environments. The color of a lion is the color
of the African savanna. The color of a polar bear is the color of
frozen seas. The fur of arctic foxes is a response to the freezing
weather. The shape of the beak of each species of bird
depends on the food she eats. The way an ibex moves has to
do with her ability to climb rocks. An animal is not an object
that you can just move from one setting to another, like a
sculpture. When you remove an animal from her natural
environment, you no longer have a complete animal, only a
fragment.
3.2 Because of processes of globalization and homogenization,
all around the world most zoos exhibit the same delocalized
animals, “star species,” such as large mammals. This
phenomenon is similar to the omnipresence of certain
international commercial brands in every big city and airport,
and it has an important consequence. The presence of the
same species in zoos all around the world instills in visitors the
belief that they know these animals, in the same way a
shopper feels familiar with the products of a commercial brand
found in many different cities and countries. Because of this, it
is more difficult for visitors to understand that when they see
an orangutan in a zoo enclosure, they are only seeing a
delocalized fragment and not a complete animal. In fact, the
more they see the orangutan in different countries, the less
likely they are to remember which environment the species
belongs to. The ubiquity of the orangutan in zoos in every
continent generates the illusion that she does not belong to
any specific environment.  
At the same time, this phenomenon exacerbates the tendency
for many people to neglect the local fauna of their own
environments because they find it too ordinary, in contrast
with the spectacularity and glamour of star species advertised
by zoos.[14]
3.3 Saito claims that in order to aesthetically appreciate
animals of a particular species, we should appreciate the
distinctive characteristics of that species: the cheetah-like-
ness, the eagle-like-ness, and so forth.[15] But animals display
their distinctive characteristics through their natural behavior.
We appreciate the agility of a cheetah when she runs, and the
elegance of an eagle when she flies. The limited and artificial
space of zoos makes it impossible for animals to behave
naturally.
Moreover, animals have to develop artificial behavior in order
to adapt to the designed spaces they are confined to. Their
enclosures are ruled by arbitrary human norms, and because
animals are often moved from one zoo to another, they may
have to readapt to new arbitrary rules. When zoos develop
programs of captive breeding, they are creating exemplars that
are only able to survive in the artificial world of a zoo,
governed by human whim.
Consider, for example, that zoos deny animals the possibility of
searching for their food. In zoos, humans decide when and how
often the animals eat, and also what kind of food they receive.
Instead of actively searching for food, the animals have to
passively wait for it. Very often, zoos give animals their food in
front of visitors, although for a wild animal it is unnatural to
eat in front of people who applaud and cheer. We should also
take into account that most zoos prevent predation, and
sometimes substitute it with very artificial behavior. For
example, bears, tigers, and lions are given food hidden inside
toys they have to open. In this particular case, zoos change
behavior expressing ferocity, velocity, and intelligence that
shows the wild animal as the dangerous creature she is for
interaction with a toy that shows the animal to be passive,
inoffensive, and childlike.
In the case of dolphins and orcas that are trained to perform,
they have to learn to obey human orders, to perform
choreographed sequences, and to learn that they receive their
food when they do as their human trainers command. Although
zoos call this enrichment, the result is that the animals have to
adapt to the arbitrary rules that humans impose on them. In
this sense, although what zoos do to animals is apparently
different from what circuses do to them, actually it is very
similar. Zoos modify animals behavior to adapt it to the very
fact that they are exhibited to an audience. 
Furthermore, captivity affects health, appearance, and
attitude. Captive animals often perform compulsive
movements, behave repetitively, and may also have wounds
and bruises. Most of them look sad, frustrated, stressed,
depressed, or angry. Their native aesthetic qualities are
seriously impoverished.
3.4 There are some specific aesthetic qualities of wild species
that it is almost impossible to appreciate at a zoo. Many wild
animals, such as big cats or crocodiles, are dangerous
creatures; they are strong, fierce, fast, imposing, and
aggressive. The appreciation of these animals has more to do
with the sublime than with beauty itself. When we have the
opportunity to encounter them in their natural environments,
they awaken our admiration at the same time as our fear. We
know that a bear or a mountain lion could kill us, and the
sensation of danger that we feel belongs to the aesthetic
experience. On seeing a wild crocodile, just as on witnessing
the power of a great storm, we experience ourselves as finite
and humble creatures before the forces of nature, and this can
be a deep and meaningful aesthetic experience. However,
when we go to admire these animals at a zoo, we encounter
subdued animals caged in small spaces and passively waiting
for their food; all their force and power has disappeared. Then
we go to the gift shop and find bears portrayed as teddy bears,
crocodiles used as a basis for funny designs on children’s
pajamas, or tigers adopted as motives for jewelry. In this way,
zoos neutralize the force and power of wild species and prevent
us from appreciating these animals as they really are. As
Thomas Leddy affirms about the souvenirs in aquariums shops:
“Many of these artifacts are clearly kitsch; they play on
sentimentality and discourage serious reflection. … It is crass
when people are encouraged to reduce their experience of a
seal to a furry purchasable item.”[16]
The aesthetics of modern zoos is constituted from a mixture of
a natural history museum, an amusement park, and a mall to
go window shopping in, and they are specially designed to
entertain children. Many zoos combine animal enclosures with
play facilities for children that are designed using
representations of animals. London Zoo has a carousel of toy
animals; Barcelona Zoo even has real ponies to ride. It is quite
remarkable that in 2013, the Barcelona City Council offered a
combined entrance ticket for both its zoo and an amusement
park called Tibidabo; the publicity for the offer depicted a real
zebra in front of a toy horse. The audience was apparently
invited to identify a real animal with a toy whose function was
to amuse children.[17]
Zoo gift shops reinforce the perception of animals as toys. The
teddy bears they sell represent animals but have softer
textures, brighter colors, and other changes that make them
more attractive to children. Similarly, children’s books are full
of animals represented as fancy imaginative creatures; some
real features are mixed with fantasy, and it can become
difficult to teach the difference between fantasy and reality. In
addition, this infantilizing of animals instills the idea that
animals belong to a childish fantasy world that should be
abandoned when one becomes an adult.
Children are the most important public at zoos; they visit zoos
both with their families and with their schools. In contrast, it is
highly infrequent to encounter adults visiting zoos with no
children. When I visited several zoos in different countries to
gather material for this paper, I went alone and spent time in
front of every enclosure taking notes. That made me a very
unusual kind of visitor, and was sufficient to awaken the
attention and suspicions of some caretakers who tried to find
out just who I was and what I was doing.
3.5 When we aim to appreciate nature aesthetically, we can
enjoy a huge range of aesthetic experiences of plants,
geological elements, meteorological events, environments, and
so on, but only through animals is nature able to look back at
us. Animals are the only natural elements that can perceive us,
that can look at us when we look at them, that can react to us
with different emotions and behavior, and that, in some cases,
can even communicate with us. This is because animals, like
us, are not objects but subjects. To look into the eyes of an
animal that looks back at you is one of the most awesome
aesthetic experiences that we can enjoy in nature. In the
words of Holmes Rolston III:
The aesthetic experience differs because of the
reciprocity. There is a ‘window’ into which we can
look and from which someone looks out. They
have, so to speak, points of view. There is fire in
those eyes.…. (…) There is kinship, as there may
not be with aesthetic contemplation of flowers or
scenery. But there is never identity, and humans
can but imagine what it must be like to be a duck,
a chipmunk, an elk, a plover. There is alien
subjectivity which stands over against human
subjectivity, a mysterious other with differences
both of degree and kind.[18]
Every animal is not only an ambassador for her species but is
an individual with a subjective life and a personal story. They
are subjects who feel pain and pleasure, who possess
cognitive, emotional, and communicative capacities, and who
possess memory and form social links.[19] As a consequence,
to be exhibited in a zoo causes them suffering. For example,
chimpanzees in a zoo become stressed, because there are so
many people around the cage all day long looking at them,
pointing at them, shouting at them, banging on the glass,
taking photos, throwing objects, and making noise.[20]
If we want to appreciate animals on their own terms, then
viewing them as subjects should be the central factor. But zoos
do not display animals as subjects. If they did, we would
understand that the animals are in the zoo against their own
desire for freedom, and that they are suffering physically and
psychologically because of their captivity. Zoos only attempt to
show animals as ambassadors of their species, and they
present them in an objectified way. For example, on the
information panels provided in the enclosures, zoos usually
offer general information about the species but it is extremely
rare for them to offer particular information about the
individuals exhibited, such as origin, history, personality,
health, family, and so on. At most, they will offer a name and
some nice anecdotes aimed at children. In contrast, in
sanctuaries and rescue centers, such as the Fundación Mona,
in Spain, that rescues chimpanzees and macaques who were
used in the circus and on TV shows and were severely abused,
the focus is on the stories of the rescued animals,  their
personalities, and the effects that captivity and mistreatment
have had on their physical and psychological health. To present
animals as individuals is necessary in order to understand what
animals are, to learn to respect them, and also to appreciate
them aesthetically, because every individual is unique.
4. Discussion
I will begin the discussion with a brief summary of the previous
sections. In the second section, I presented some arguments in
defense of the idea that we can appreciate the aesthetic
qualities of wild species through captive exemplars held in
zoos. That is, that zoos are appropriate places to go if we want
to admire the aesthetic qualities of wild animals. Then, in the
third section, I provided several arguments against that thesis.
Now, I wish to bring both sets of arguments together and play
them off against each other.
All the arguments in favor of zoos share a common idea: that
zoos offer us an objective, neutral, and unbiased frame that
allows us to appreciate animals as they are. According to these
arguments, zoo enclosures are windows into nature; zoos
frame a piece of nature for us, and give us enhanced
conditions of visibility that we could not find in the wild. In
contrast, arguments against zoos share an opposing idea, that
beneath the appearance of objectivity zoos are actually
presenting us with an incomplete, superficial, and distorted
view of animals. In order to be exhibited in the zoo enclosure,
the animals have been extracted from the environments where
they belong and without which they lose part of their identity.
In these enclosures, the animals cannot behave naturally and,
at the same time, are forced to perform artificially. Because of
all this, captivity affects the physical and psychological health
of animals. Furthermore, zoos are presenting animals as
ornamental objects to contemplate, as nice appearances to
watch and photograph, but not as subjects who also look at us
and who suffer from stress when they see so many people
looking at them every day. The way in which zoos provide
information on animals is deeply biased in order to foster their
infantilization. They are presented as fantasy creatures and
toys, not as the wild animals they are.
When we bring the two arguments together, the following idea
comes to the fore. What makes visitors believe that they are
appreciating the aesthetic qualities of wild species in zoos is
the mere fact that they are perceiving the real animals that are
in front of them in the enclosures. In this situation, it is easy to
believe that zoos are windows into nature. It is more difficult to
understand that zoos use real animals to prevent visitors from
viewing animals on their own terms. What the arguments
against zoos are telling us is that zoos are not windows into
nature but Procrustean beds. In order to comprehend this, we
need to compare the aesthetic appreciation of animals in the
wild and animals in zoos. At the zoo, we encounter the body of
the animal in the cage but we are missing the conditions in
which that body can flourish. We are missing the environment
which the animal belongs in and where she can develop her
way of life. Furthermore, we are missing a correct framework
that would allow us to understand all this.
Zoos reduce animals to bodies, to a mere physical presence, to
ornamental objects that can be exhibited and contemplated, to
pleasant appearances we like to watch, but the true identity of
an animal is much more than her body. They are subjects with
different capacities, who develop and express their identity in
complex behavior and through multiple relations with their
environment, and with all the other individuals of the same and
different species who inhabit it. This is the core of the problem.
At a zoo, we cannot appreciate in a serious and deep way the
aesthetic qualities of wild species because zoos are not
showing us wild animals on their own terms.
Zoos present the cage as an objective and unbiased frame
within which to view animals, but a cage encloses the animal
far away from her environment and her freedom. The cage is
not an unbiased frame but a Procrustean bed, an artifact that
radically changes the life of the animal held in it. The cage
contains the body of the animal but has, in fact, mutilated her
identity. Unfortunately, if people have visited zoos since
childhood and have always seen animals this way, they are
unlikely to be conscious of what they are missing. 
In addition, we have to emphasize the fact that zoos
aestheticize captivity and normalize the image of wild animals
behind bars in artificial enclosures and displayed for our
enjoyment. In a zoo, the audience learns to accept the
captivity of animals as a spectacle to watch, and this reinforces
the view of animals as our property, as commodities for us to
use as we wish.[21] Although zoos claim that the function of
holding animals captive is to convince us to protect wild
animals in their natural habitats, it is difficult to see how the
image of a caged animal can teach us the value of freedom.
This contradictory message that a cage can help to protect
freedom actually becomes a justification for holding the animal
in the cage. When children visit zoos with their schools and
families, they learn that cages are the places where animals
live.
The negative effects of zoos are not limited to old-fashioned
ones with animals confined in small and simple cages without
enrichment. Although modern zoos offer larger and enriched
enclosures, the animals are still captive in artificial spaces ruled
by arbitrary human norms. The aim of zoos is to exhibit the
animals, and because of this, even the most modern zoos treat
animals as spectacles to watch, expose them many hours
every day to the noise and annoyances that people produce,
and foster an objectified, distorted, and infantilized view of
them.
5. The need for animal aesthetics
After that brief discussion, I would like to consider the specific
question regarding the aesthetic appreciation of animals in
zoos from a broader perspective. As I mentioned at the
beginning of this paper, there is not yet sufficient literature on
animal aesthetics for it to be considered as a research field in
its own right. What are the reasons for this?
In his paper, “The Aesthetic Value of Animals,” Glenn Parsons
sets out to identify and analyze the reasons philosophers could
have for not embarking on the study of animal aesthetics.[22]
One of the reasons he examines is that the aesthetic
appreciation of beings that deserve moral respect, such as
humans and other animals, quickly becomes morally and
politically problematic. According to Parsons, the problem is
that the aesthetic appreciation of animals or humans seems to
focus only on their external appearance; that is, it seems to
reduce them to a superficial perspective. As a consequence, it
would seem that to defend the aesthetic appreciation of
animals could go against their defense as subjects who deserve
moral respect. The “immorality objection” for engaging in
animal aesthetics, as Parsons calls this, means that we should
study animals as part of ethics, not within aesthetics.
I agree with Parsons that this may be one of the reasons for
the neglect of animal aesthetics, and I also sympathize with his
way of defending animal aesthetics against this objection.
Parsons claims that an appropriate animal aesthetics cannot be
attacked via the “immorality objection” because it does not
reduce animals to their mere appearance and does not relate
with them in a shallow way. Quite the contrary. An appropriate
animal aesthetics takes into account the nature of animals in a
significant way. His idea is that to aesthetically appreciate
animals means to appreciate their functional beauty,  to
appreciate how they are “looking fit for function.” For example,
the body of a cheetah is beautiful because it is functional,
because it is constituted in such a way that allows the animal
to run at high speed, which is one of the principal
characteristics of the behavior of a cheetah. By appreciating
the functional beauty of animals, by appreciating how animals
are indeed “looking fit for function,” we appreciate their
aesthetic value as it is intrinsically related to their nature.
I also value a partially similar approach by Ned Hettinger, in
his paper, “Animal Beauty, Ethics, and Environmental
Preservation,” to the defense of animal aesthetics when faced
with a set of arguments that run along the same lines as the
“immorality objection.” Although I do not agree with some of
his ideas, I do agree with his claim that the aesthetic
appreciation of animals is more rich and complex than a trivial
appreciation of the mere attractiveness of a body.[23]
What I find is most important to defend here, however, as an
answer to this kind of objection, is that to develop animal
aesthetics could be enormously helpful to animal ethics. My
point is that several forms of exploitation and mistreatment of
animals imply a shallow and distorted aesthetic appreciation of
them, and the claim I wish to make is that a critical theory of
animal aesthetics would allow us to analyze and denounce such
cases. The problem posed by the appreciation of animals at
zoos is just such an example. The case of circus animal shows
would be another, and I can imagine several more:
bullfighting, hunting, bird song competitions, horse and dog
racing, and so on. We could analyze how, in these cases,
animals are reduced to their external appearance and treated
as mere ornamental objects, as spectacles to watch, and we
could contrast this with an opposing serious and deep aesthetic
appreciation of those animals.
In order to appreciate animals in an appropriate way, as Yuriko
Saito affirms, we should appreciate them on their own terms,
as what they are. We can respectfully visit their environments
and view animals there as subjects who are living their lives.
We do not need to travel far away to see “star species,” we can
go to the nearest forest or beach and take delight in the local
fauna. If we feed our aesthetic appreciation with the
knowledge provided by natural science, as Allen Carlson
recommends we do, and we contemplate animals with some
background knowledge of their physiology, evolutionary story,
behavior, capacities, and so on, then we can enjoy a
progressively deeper appreciation. In the behavioral patterns
of every species, we will appreciate the expression of a specific
intelligence, and of different ways to resolve problems, to
express emotions, and to communicate with others. And no
matter how much knowledge we possess concerning them,
animals will always surprise us. Surprise is the gift that free
animals offer us and that zoos take away. Precisely because
zoos can assure us that we are going to see the animals, that
the animals are waiting in their cages to be seen, the magic of
surprise, which is the magic of freedom, disappears. 
With time and patience, we learn to recognize the songs of
different bird species, and we appreciate in this a plurality of
aesthetic qualities; we find some birdsong harmonious, some
joyful, and another melancholic. We see that every bird flies in
a particular manner, and we judge some flights to be graceful,
others elegant, and others mysterious. We learn to appreciate
the subtleties of the facial expressions of mammals, who can
look beautiful to us but also terrifying. We enjoy the way
animals hide in and mimic the vegetation, so that sometimes,
despite being so very near, they are almost impossible to
perceive. We follow stories, the stories of particular individuals
we recognize, whose behavior we observe over years, and we
happily follow stories of learning, when young birds learn to fly,
for example. But we also follow dramas, such as when an
individual is expelled from a group and has to set out alone.
And, unfortunately, we follow tragedies, as when one animal is
killed by another and mourned by her fellows. Seeing behavior
such as predation, we find that aesthetic appreciation of
animals not only gives us pleasure but it can also cause us
displeasure and provoke in us suffering, sadness, and
melancholy.
In her article, “Ugliness and Nature,” Emily Brady reflects on
the aesthetic appreciation of predation and defends the notion
that some animal species, some animal behavior, some
individual animals affected by disease, and the corpses of dead
animals can be judged as ugly. She also reflects on other
aesthetic qualities that provoke different kinds of displeasure in
us, and affirms that the aesthetic appreciation of these
qualities plays its own role in our relation with animals and
nature.[24]
In summary, the aesthetic appreciation of animals is not about
ornamental objects or mere bodies and appearances, it is the
appreciation of subjects living their lives. As a consequence,
the appreciation of animals leads us to appreciate the networks
of life to which they belong and the environments they inhabit.
However, we should face the problem of the impact that may
be caused by too many people visiting some environments.
One solution could be to combine the visits with other
strategies, like the installation of webcams in the environments
that allow us to watch wild animals without disturbing them
and can be used for scientific and educational purposes, be
commented on in social networks, and so on.
The diversity of animal species is so huge that we still do not
even know how many currently inhabit this planet. When we
concentrate on appreciating dragonflies, for example, we find
that there are currently more than 3,000 species. By
comparing different dragonflies, we can admire multiple
combinations of forms and colors and also variations in
behavior. In this way, aesthetic appreciation of animals
teaches us to take delight in difference and plurality, that is,
biodiversity. Biologists tell us that biodiversity is the
fundamental measure of the health of an environment. If there
is a wide variety of species, and also a wide genetic variety
within every species, then it is a healthy environment. If there
is a low level of biodiversity, the environment is stressed and
can be more easily affected by disease. In a similar way, we
can state that biodiversity is a measure of the aesthetic
richness of an environment.
That we aesthetically appreciate animals does not mean that
we should protect the species we judge to be beautiful and
eliminate those we judge to be ugly. Precisely what aesthetic
appreciation of animals teaches us is that beautiful and ugly
are only two of the great diversity of aesthetic qualities we
value in different species, and also in the different behavior
exhibited by the same species, which can be judged as
elegant, harmonious, joyful, playful, graceful, fierce, majestic,
imposing, delicate, fragile, tender, colorful, monstrous, comic,
mysterious, enigmatic, interesting, melancholic, disgusting,
terrifying, sublime, and so on. Some of these qualities prompt
different kinds of pleasure in us, like joy, serenity, vitality,
amusement, surprise, and so on, and others provoke different
kinds of displeasure in us, for example, sadness, fear, or
disgust. This plurality of aesthetic qualities is the appropriate
way to admire biodiversity, which is the very core of nature. It
is appropriate to find aesthetic value in every species, and
because each one is unique and plays her own role in her
environment and has a particular way of life, in every species
we can admire a different combination of aesthetic qualities.
To classify species as beautiful or ugly would be to reduce the
immense diversity of nature to a simplistic binary system. To
protect the animals we judge to be beautiful and eliminate
those we find ugly would be to subject the plurality of nature to
the monopoly of a very particular taste imposed by one
species. An environment will always be aesthetically richer if it
has a high level of biodiversity, and it will be aesthetically
poorer if it is dominated by one species that imposes her
particular criteria on it. The cause of the present aesthetic
impoverishment of nature is the extinction of species and
destruction of habitats brought about by humans. I should add,
nonetheless, that people do not only damage species they find
ugly, they also damage the ones they find aesthetically
attractive because they hunt them to gain a trophy or to
display them in their collections, and here we once again run
into to the problem with zoos.
Furthermore, I think that a serious and deep aesthetic
appreciation of animals can instill moral respect in us. That
aesthetics could lead to ethics is an old hope in philosophy that
has been defended in several ways and criticized in many
others. It is a tricky topic that, no doubt, we will continue to
discuss forever. We can look, however, to what happens in
environmental philosophy. In the field of environmental
aesthetics, we find a common expectation shared by many
authors that a serious and deep aesthetic appreciation of the
environment can lead to an ethical commitment. Every
environmental philosopher defends this idea in his or her
particular manner, and some may be more optimistic than
others. But there is a shared intuition that aesthetics and
ethics can reinforce each other and that they should work
together to protect nature.[25] I have the same expectation
and the same hope of animal aesthetics working together with
animal ethics.
Notwithstanding, some philosophers defend the need for
animal aesthetics but not this strong connection with ethics.
This is the case, I think, with Stephen Davies. In his book, The
Artful Species, Davies offers an interesting contribution to
animal aesthetics, studying the evolutionary roots of our
appreciation of animals. He describes many different ways of
appreciating animals aesthetically. But when it comes to the
relation with ethics, Davies denies any direct connection
between a superficial appreciation of animals and morally
wrong behavior towards them, and claims that a superficial
appreciation of animals can also be valuable. Discussing the
idea defended by Carlson and Parsons that we should
appreciate animals for what they are, Davies affirms:
I share the thought that we can take pleasure in
an animal’s suitedness to its environment and
way of life, but I think alternative approaches to
animal beauty are not inappropriate or immoral in
the way that is suggested. For instance, we might
consider a bird as if it is a mobile sculpture. …so
long as it does not lead to immoral behavior,
there need be nothing untoward in pursuing and
enjoying an aesthetic response that is shallow. …
There is no doubt that animals can be and often
are morally wronged by humans. But I doubt that
there’s a direct connection between that fact and
the adoption of an aesthetic attitude to an
animal’s appearance that is partial or even
shallow.[26]
I believe that such a connection does exist. To see a bird as a
mobile sculpture, as in the example Davies proposes, means
seeing the bird as an ornamental object and not as a subject.
Objectifying a subject in this fashion is a way to prepare the
terrain for her exploitation. The problem is not an isolated case
but the fact that in our society the appreciation of animals as
ornamental objects is systematic, and this kind of appreciation
fosters an attitude that makes it easy to exploit and mistreat
animals.
Viewing an animal as what she is, viewing an animal as a
subject developing her own way of life, entails a basic form of
respect, and it is this basic form of respect that can lead to an
ethical commitment. To appreciate an animal as what she is
requires an effort on our part to give primacy to the animal
over our desires and interests; it requires an attitude of
humility. It means listening to the animal instead of imposing
our own voice. In contrast, when we have a distorted and
superficial view of animals, we give primacy to our own desires
and interests over those of the animal. We want the animal to
look like and to mean what we want it to, and this attitude is a
will for dominance over the animal. We conceive the animal as
a mere instrument for our own ends, as an aesthetic
instrument. We want to dissociate the appearance of the
animal from her identity, and use her appearance to dress our
own ideas.
How can the appreciation of a bird as if she were a mobile
sculpture lead us to behave in a morally wrong way towards
that animal? I think it could lead to killing the bird, dissecting
her, and exhibiting her as a sculpture in a literal sense. Or it
could lead to putting the bird in a cage for the rest of her life,
as many people do. If we conceive and appreciate the animal
as an object, it is easier for us to treat her as an object. In
contrast, if we appreciate the bird as a subject who has her
own interests, desires, and emotions, and her own life to live,
then it is easier for us to develop an attitude of respect for her
life and her freedom, easier that we step back and renounce
dominance over her, stop reducing her to an instrument for our
own ends.
To impose our fantasies on an animal is a form of aesthetic
domination, and it has a strong connection with real
domination and real abuse. There is a connection between the
aesthetic appreciation of animals as toys and the exploitation
of animals in circus shows, where they are forced to perform as
if they were toys. There is a connection between the aesthetic
appreciation of a bull as a dark monster that symbolizes night
and death, and cruelly killing him in a bullfight. In several
cases of exploitation and mistreatment of animals, we are
forcing them to incarnate our fantasies, metaphors, and
symbols. We impose our stories on animals with such
conviction and intensity, we impose our stories on so many
animals and so often and in such a systematic way, that we
finally forget the identity of the animals and believe that our
fantasies are their true identities. This is exactly what I think
happens in zoos.
6. Conclusion
For all these reasons, I believe that at a zoo we cannot
appreciate the aesthetic qualities of wild species in a serious
and deep way. Furthermore, I argue that the fact that
zoological parks cannot reveal the aesthetic qualities of animals
to us in a serious and deep way sharply brings into question
the effectiveness of zoos at raising awareness concerning
endangered species. I think that this criticism should be added
to the moral and scientific criticism that philosophers and
experts on wildlife level against zoos.
Of course, different arguments could be raised against my
claims, and further discussion will be necessary. However, the
only way to discuss all this in detail is to give animal aesthetics
the attention it deserves. Environmental aesthetics is a rich
field that enters into fertile dialogue and collaboration with
environmental ethics. Animal aesthetics could play a similar
role in relation to animal ethics. In fact, I think that the four
disciplines could work side by side towards a deeper
understanding of our relation with animals and nature, and
help us to find a way to a better life together.
I think, further, that animal aesthetics should enter into
dialogue with non-philosophical disciplines that also focus on
our relation with animals and take into account aesthetic
perspectives. Ecocriticism, critical animal studies, and visual
studies applied to animals are clear cases in point. In fact, it is
interesting to see how, in these fields, reflection on animals is
rapidly growing.[27] Animals are becoming the center of
interest of many disciplines, and it would be a regrettable loss
if philosophers were not to develop animal aesthetics.
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